Florida Historical Quarterly
Volume 68
Number 4 Florida Historical Quarterly, Volume
68, Number 4

Article 3

1989

Cramer v. Kirk: The Florida Republican Schism of 1970
Billy B. Hathorn

Part of the American Studies Commons, and the United States History Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida
Historical Quarterly by an authorized editor of STARS. For more information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

Recommended Citation
Hathorn, Billy B. (1989) "Cramer v. Kirk: The Florida Republican Schism of 1970," Florida Historical
Quarterly: Vol. 68 : No. 4 , Article 3.
Available at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol68/iss4/3

Hathorn: Cramer v. Kirk: The Florida Republican Schism of 1970

CRAMER V. KIRK: THE FLORIDA
REPUBLICAN SCHISM OF 1970
b y B I L L Y B. H A T H O R N

H

aving languished for nearly a century as a nominal political entity, Florida Republicans seemed poised by 1970 to
establish parity, if not supplant, the Democrats as the Sunshine
State’s majority party. The groundwork for such a metamorphosis had been laid when Eisenhower and Nixon won Florida
in four of the five presidential elections between 1952 and 1968.
William Cato “Bill” Cramer was elected in 1954 as the state’s
first twentieth-century Republican Congressman, and Claude
Roy Kirk, Jr., seized the governorship twelve years later amid
the internecine bickering of Democratic factions. Moreover, Edward J. Gurney’s 1968 United States Senate victory was the sole
statewide Republican triumph that year outside the presidential
contest in the eleven ex-Confederate states. In the crucial 1970
elections, the Republicans seemed poised to re-elect Kirk and
win a second Senate seat with what the New York Times termed
“inexorable strength and unlimited potential.“1 But the squabbling that previously crippled the Democrats now wreaked havoc
on the fledgling GOP as the conflicting interests of five leading
Republicans shook the party to its foundation: Congressman
Cramer and his senatorial rival, former Judge G. Harrold
Carswell; Governor Kirk and his primary foe, businessman Jack
M. Eckerd; and Senator Gurney, whose potential soon deteriorated to the extent that he would retire from politics after a
single term. It may be argued, however, that despite the 1970
losses, the GOP could have remained competitive in Florida had
Kirk not undermined Cramer’s Senate candidacy. This article
examines how the Cramer-Kirk schism helped re-cement Democratic hegemony and delayed the establishment of a competitive
two-party system in Florida.
Billy B. Hathorn is instructor of history and political science, Laredo Junior
College, Laredo, TX.
1. New York Times, September 30, 1970,
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Cramer was born in Denver, Colorado, August 4, 1922, and
moved with his parents to St. Petersburg where he would wage
his first political campaigns in student government at St.
Petersburg High School and Junior College. His roots were anchored in the Protestant “work ethic”: as a teenager he sold
fruit, flowers, and candy and worked as a grocery clerk and
theater usher. Before entering college at the University of North
Carolina, he was a bellhop at a North Carolina resort hotel.
When Cramer sought public office, voters who remembered his
active youth dubbed him “the orange boy.“2 After World War
II service in Europe and subsequent graduation from the Harvard Law School, Cramer was admitted to the Florida bar. He
became a Republican in 1949 when statewide registration was
still fourteen-to-one Democratic. Among those nudging Cramer
to Republicanism was his law partner, Herman Wilson Goldner,
subsequently mayor of St. Petersburg.
Florida’s geographic configuration and uneven population
distribution has made it more difficult for Democratic factions
to persist because urbanites have been unwilling to accept domination by a few party leaders. V. O. Key, Jr., described Florida
elections in the years prior to the modern Republican
emergence as “personality-oriented within narrow ideological
boundaries.” At first, the Republicans, largely migrants from
the Midwest and North, challenged Democratic control in Pinellas County and other retiree centers. The migration of business
executives and older citizens had drastically altered the partisan
profile of the region. As early as 1928, Herbert Hoover helped
carry Pinellas Republicans to victory in races for sheriff, judge,
assessor, and state senator. In 1948, Republican Thomas E.
Dewey won Pinellas, Sarasota, Palm Beach, Broward, and
Orange counties, and a third of the statewide vote. Dissent
against the national Democrats resumed between 1952 and
1972, though Lyndon Johnson carried both Florida and Pinellas
County as part of his presidential victory. Jimmy Carter, be-

2. William Cramer, tape-recorded interview with author, Washington, DC,
February 12, 1988; Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1971
(Washington, DC, 1971), 796. Besides consenting to a twenty-three-page,
single-spaced, typed interview with the author, Cramer has deposited his
congressional papers with the Cramer Library, University of Tampa.
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neficiary of an influx of blue-collar voters, almost won Pinellas
County in 1976.3
Cramer ran for the legislature in 1950, and was campaign
manager for the Pinellas Republican slate, none of whose fourteen members had previously sought office. The Republicans,
decrying inefficient government and “boss-type” politics, organized at the grassroots and, at Cramer’s insistence, offered a
unified ticket, a procedure still followed in the county. All but
one of the GOP candidates were elected. Cramer became “titular
head” of the Pinellas GOP; in 1974, the State Executive Committee honored him as Florida’s “Mr. Republican.“4
In 1967, the Tampa Tribune humorously paraphrased
Genesis to stress Cramer’s role in the GOP: “In the beginning
there was the party, and the party was with Bill Cramer, and
the party was Bill Cramer.“5 When Cramer’s two Republican
colleagues named him minority leader in 1951, Democrats
teased them for “caucusing in a phone booth.” The Florida legislature operates under United States House rules, and Cramer’s
assertion of “minority rights” raised his visibility and influence.
He defended junior colleges from challenges waged by the legislative leadership and the four-year institutions; Cramer considered such schools essential to low-cost education. He also
worked to establish the state’s first anti-crime commission, but
the Democrats refused to name any Republicans to the panel.6
In 1952, Cramer ran for Congress in an “open” district
against Democrat Courtney W. Campbell, a Clearwater
businessman and former state highway board member. Spending $25,000 in a handshaking campaign about Pinellas, Hill3. Bruce A. Campbell, “Patterns of Change in the Partisan Loyalties of Native
Southerners: 1952-1972,” Journal of Politics 39 (August 1977), 736-37, 755,
761; Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation of Southern Politics:
Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945 (New York, 1976), 117;
New York Times, September 11, 30, 1970; V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in
State and Nation (New York, 1949), 83-85, 281; David J. Ginzl, “The Politics
of Patronage: Florida Republicans During the Hoover Administration,”
Florida Historical Quarterly 61 (July 1982), 5; U.S. News and World Report,
November 12, 1954, 30; Alexander P. Lamis, The Two-Party South (New
York, 1984), 181; Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa and Douglas Matthews,
The Almanac of American Politics (New York, 1979), 182-83.
4. Cramer interview; U.S. News and World Report, November 12, 1954, 87;
Time, November 15, 1954, 26.
5. Tampa Tribune, June 18, 1967.
6. Cramer interview.
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sborough, Pasco, and Hernando counties, Cramer benefited
from the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket, though he lost by .7 percent.
In 1954, Cramer, with a stronger organization, unseated
Campbell by the same .7 percent margin. Cramer, however,
found the $40,000 spent in the race insufficient for television
advertising. The state GOP, which had offered no aid in 1952,
contributed $4,000 in 1954.7 Florida Democratic Congressman
Robert “Bob” Sikes depicted Campbell as “hard-working, dedicated and capable” but ineffective in public speaking. Sikes, who
stumped for Campbell, later remembered: “[I]t was easy to diagnose the trouble; Courtney couldn’t cope with the articulate
Cramer on the platform. His speeches were wooden and uninteresting. I attempted to help him and even wrote out some
short messages which I thought would be effective in getting his
story across to his constituents. I was dismayed when I heard
him deliver them. He sounded like a third grader struggling
through a reading assignment. Cramer was articulate, a successful lawyer, and he already enjoyed some recognition in public
life. In my effort to help Campbell, I said that Cramer, serving
in a Democratic Congress, would be like a lost ball in high weeds.
Bill never let me forget that statement, although subsequently
we became good friends.“8
Cramer’s breakthrough did not seem to register with GOP
chairman Harold Alexander of Fort Myers who handled federal
patronage outside Cramer’s district. Cramer recalls that Alexander did “his best to put me in my place,” though Cramer was
the first Republican in the Florida delegation in seventy-two
years. Cramer claims Alexander overemphasized patronage to
the neglect of voter registration.9
By 1964, after a decade in the House, Cramer was elected
in the primary as Republican national committeeman, a position
he held for twenty consecutive years, and he headed a presidential delegate slate pledged to Barry Goldwater. Cramer said
Goldwater asked him to circumvent the party “regulars” led by

7. Ibid.; Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 697; Florida, General
Election Returns, November, 1954 (Tallahassee, 1954); U. S. News and World
Report, November 21, 1952, 49-51; November 1 2 , 1954, 87; Time,
November 15, 1954, 26.
8. Robert Lee Fulton Sikes, He-Coon: The Bob Sikes Story (Pensacola, 1985), 324.
9. Cramer interview.
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Alexander’s successor, Tom Brown of Tampa, because the
leadership had been too passive in the past. Gurney, a transplanted New Englander from Winter Park who had been elected
to Congress in 1962, initially joined the insurgents. Cramer
claimed the state committee had “never been really interested
in electing Republicans,” and had “ignored Republicans when
they were elected.” When the primary grew divisive, Gurney
withdrew his earlier backing of the Cramer insurgents. The
Goldwaterites tried to “marry” the two slates, but Cramer said
Brown’s faction made such demands that no “marriage” was
possible. When Goldwater’s nomination became certain, GOP
strategist Richard Kleindienst halted a scheduled appearance
for the Cramer slate by Goldwater’s two sons. As the “regulars”
just barely won the primary, Cramer contends his side could
have prevailed had Goldwater’s backing remaind intact. Cramer
charged that the “regulars” may have “sold out” Goldwater had
the “stop-Goldwater” coalition been credible.10
In 1964, the politically unknown Claude Kirk opposed
Democratic Senator Spessard L. Holland, the former governor
and epitome of the Florida Democratic “establishment.” While
considered a “sacrificial lamb,” Kirk campaigned enthusiastically
and polled 36.1 percent of the vote. Born in California, Kirk
later moved to Montgomery, Alabama, where his father was
secretary to the state House of Representatives. Before entering
politics, he formed the American Heritage Life Insurance Company in Jacksonville and the Kirk Investment Company in Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil.11 Cramer claims that Kirk would “beg me” to
let him address meetings during the delegate and national committeeman races. Thereby, Cramer contends that Kirk received
his first exposure to GOP voters. 12 Two years later, having
labeled his Democratic rival, Miami Mayor Robert King High,
as an “ultraliberal,” Kirk was elected governor in a startling
upset. He polled 821,190 votes to High’s 668,233 and carried
fifty-six of the state’s sixty-seven counties. Kirk received 355,585

10. Ibid,; Barone, et al., The Almanac of American Politics, 187; Robert D. Novak,
The Agony of the G.O.P., 1964 (New York, 1965), 291-92, 368; Bernard
Cosman, Five States for Goldwater (Tuscaloosa, 1966), 112.
11. Charles Moritz, ed., Current Biography Yearbook, 1967 (New York, 1967),
232.
12. Cramer interview.
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more votes than the number of registered Republicans.13 Sometime during the campaign, a schism developed between Cramer
and Kirk. The “bad blood” has persisted to the point that in a
1988 interview, Kirk said he could not recall Cramer’s having
rendered him any assistance in his 1964 or 1966 races. “Cramer
never helped me do anything,” Kirk reported. “At all times he
was a total combatant.“14
Kirk claims that Cramer wanted the gubernatorial nomination himself after the “conservative” runner-up Democrat, Governor Haydon Burns, refused to endorse High. Kirk said that
Cramer’s legislative assistant, Jack P. Inscoe, a Tampa developer, could verify that Cramer had asked Kirk to bow out.
Kirk contends the three met in May or June of 1966 “in a car
15
. . . probably in Palm Beach County.“ Inscoe denies the allegation. “This never happened. Kirk is not known for telling too
much truth.” Though Cramer insists that he never wished to be
governor, Kirk asks, “How could I have brought this up if it
didn’t happen?“16
Cramer subsequently urged Kirk to merge the Pinellas
gubernatorial operation with the regular organization, but Kirk
organized a separate campaign to maximize Democratic support. Cramer recalls this disagreement as the “first indication
that Kirk intended to do his own thing and attempt to form his
own organization within the Republican party in Florida. I
didn’t get the signal at the time, but it became very obvious later,
particularly when he attempted to defeat me as national committeeman in 1968.“17 Kirk asked Gurney to serve as chairman at
his inauguration, although Gurney had not been involved in the
early Kirk campaigns. Cramer was not even asked to serve on
18
the inaugural committee. In 1968, Kirk dispatched his staff to

13. High had become the Democratic candidate after a very bitter and divisive
party campaign against the incumbent, Governor Haydon Burns. Florida,
General Election Returns, November 8, 1966; Moritz, Current Biography Yearbook, 1967, 233.
14. Claude Kirk, telephone interview with author, Palm Beach, FL, March 7,
1988.
15. Ibid., May 3, 1988.
16. Jack Inscoe, telephone conversation with author, Tampa, FL, May 3, 1988;
Cramer interview.
17. Kirk interview, May 3, 1988; Cramer interview.
18. Cramer interview.
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the Republican state convention in Orlando to seek Cramer’s
removal as national committeeman. “I wanted my own man,”
Kirk said. “After all, I was the leader of the party. If Cramer
had been the leader of the party, he would have wanted his own
man too.“19 Cramer accused Kirk of attempting to be “not only
the governor but the king of the party, and I was about the only
person at the time who stood in his way from taking total control.” Cramer attributes his retention as committeeman to the
loyalty of organizational Republicans. “I had proved myself an
effective congressman. I was on the House leadership as vicechairman of the Republican Conference and was ranking
member on the Public Works Committee.“20
Recalling a 1967 visit to Kirk’s office, Cramer said that a
former legislator was denied an appointment with the governor
even though the man was a stalwart Republican. “Kirk made it
very clear that he got a great deal of joy in making sure that this
guy didn’t get an appointment. . . . He just loved to kick people
in the teeth to show how much power he had,” Cramer charged.
Despite witnessing such scenes, Cramer claimed party unity led
him to avoid public criticism of Kirk; Cramer viewed Kirk as
21
“his own worst enemy.“ Kirk denies that he ever had a “serious
discussion” with Cramer on any topic.22 Walter Wurfel, a Floridian who was President Carter’s deputy press secretary, termed
Kirk’s election in 1966 the “worst thing that could have happened to the Republicans. He wasn’t interested in the Republican party; party was a matter of convenience for him.“23
Cramer believed that Kirk may have become vice-president
or president had he tended to his gubernatorial duties. Eying
the vice-presidency, Kirk stood alone from his delegation at the
Miami convention by supporting New York Governor Nelson
Rockefeller rather than the almost certain nominee, Richard
Nixon. Cramer claims that Nixon might have selected Kirk over
Spiro T. Agnew of Maryland, another freshman governor, had
Kirk met his responsibilities as governor of Florida rather than
actively soliciting the vice-presidency. Kirk claims that it had
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Kirk interview, March 7, 1988.
Cramer interview.
Ibid.
Kirk interview, March 7, 1988.
Quoted in Lamis, Two-Party South, 292.
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been “agreed” that he would run with either Nixon or Rockefeller, but, he insists, Nixon picked Agnew to obtain contributions
from Greek-American businessmen.24
While the Republicans convened in Miami in 1968, the party
sensed a historic opportunity to gain the Senate seat being vacated by George Smathers. The Democratic nomination went to
former Governor LeRoy Collins, an ally of the embattled President Johnson. Cramer and Gurney were prospective primary
opponents until Cramer, citing a “gentlemen’s agreement” with
Gurney, said he had stepped aside to permit his colleague to
run with the “understanding” that Gurney would back Cramer
for senator in 1970. “He pledged his support to me, and I did
to him, and we shook hands.” Cramer added that postponement
of his Senate race would allow him to finish various projects in
the House.25
Cramer’s former law partner, Herman Goldner, termed by
the press as a “liberal” Republican after he backed Johnson in
1964, opposed Gurney in the primary, but he polled only a few
votes. 26 Gurney defeated Collins in the general election,
1,131,499 to 892,637, and carried all but four counties. Thereafter, Gurney and Cramer crisscrossed the state in various partybuilding activities. In the fall of 1969, a few weeks before Senator Holland confirmed his retirement, Cramer declared his candidacy for the Senate. Nixon had urged Cramer to run. “Bill,
the Senate needs you, the country needs you, the people need
you— now, run.“27
The Cramer-Gurney “agreement” unraveled after April 8,
1970, when the Senate rejected Nixon’s second consecutive Supreme Court nominee, Tallahassee’s Judge Harrold Carswell of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, whose judicial service had
begun under Eisenhower. Gurney and Holland, both Carswell
supporters, were dismayed when a bipartisan coalition rejected
him fifty-five to forty-five on allegations of “mediocrity” and
24. Cramer interview; Kirk interview, March 7, 1988.
25. Cramer interview.
26. New York Times, January 28, May 8, 1968. See Patrick H. Gaddell, “Florida
Politics: The Myth and the Reality” (honors thesis, Harvard University,
May 1969) for details of the 1966 and 1968 elections.
27. Florida, General Election Returns, November 5, 1968; New York Times, September 18, 28, November 13, 1969, April 29, 1970; Newsweek, May 4, 1970,
29.
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past “racism.“28 Carswell was quoted as having stated in the late
1940s, while living in Georgia, that “segregation is the only practical and correct way of life in our states. I have always believed
and shall always act so.“29 In his defense, Carswell noted that
former Presidents Truman and Johnson had made similar comments in their earlier years. Hoping to benefit from the uproar
in Florida over Carswell’s rejection, aides of either Kirk or Gurney proposed that Carswell resign from the bench to run for
the United States Senate. Gurney, who declined to discuss the
“gentlemen’s agreement” with Cramer, said only that he and
Cramer have “totally different opinions on that. That is ancient
history, and I see no point in reviving things. . . . If I told my
complete version of the matter, Cramer would not believe me,
and I don’t want Bill angry at me.” Gurney added that he was
unaware that Cramer had considered running for the Senate at
the time Gurney declared his candidacy.30
When Kirk and Gurney endorsed Carswell, Florida Lieutenant Governor Ray C. Osborne, a Kirk ally from St. Petersburg,
abandoned his own challenge to Cramer. Years later, Kirk said
that he “should have stuck with Osborne [now a Boca Raton
attorney] and not encouraged Carswell to run.” He insisted that
he had not “created” Carswell’s candidacy.31 Carswell said he
wanted to “confront the liberals who shot me down” but denied
that Kirk took advantage of the failed confirmation to thwart
Cramer. “I was only vaguely aware of any differences between
Kirk and Cramer. . . . Neither then nor now did I feel used. . . .
What feud they had was their own.” Carswell added that he had
no knowledge of any “gentlemen’s agreement” between Cramer
and Gurney and had considered running for the Senate before
Nixon nominated him to the Supreme Court.32 Quoting the
verse “by your enemies ye shall be known,” Carswell blamed his

28. New York Times, April 9, 26, July 13, 1970.
29. Ibid., April 21, July 13, 1970.
30. Ibid., July 13, 1970; Edward Gurney, telephone interview with author,
Winter Park, FL, May 6, 1988.
31. Kirk interview, March 7, 1988; U. S. News and World Report, September 7,
1970, 34-35; New York Times, April 21, 1970.
32. Newsweek, May 4, 1970, 29; Harrold Carswell, written interview, Monticello,
FL, March 10, 1988.
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loss on “dark evil winds of liberalism” and the “northern press
and its knee-jerking followers in the Senate.“33
Carswell believed that Florida needed a second Republican
senator because “even a conservative Democrat would automatically vote to place the chamber under ‘liberal’ control.“34
Carswell recalled that Rogers C. B. Morton, Republican National Chairman and Maryland Representative, had told him
that he considered Carswell “clearly electable” and thought
Cramer should not risk a “safe” House seat. Whether Carswell
expected to bluff Cramer from the race, the judge insists that
he and his family were not unduly influenced by anyone.35 Disputing Carswell’s interpretation of the late Rogers Morton’s position, Cramer said that he learned of Carswell’s candidacy in a
call from Morton, whom Cramer described as “my dear personal
friend.” When Morton asked if Cramer planned to abandon the
Senate race, Cramer replied that neither Carswell, Kirk, nor
Gurney had consulted him. Cramer quoted Morton as having
lividly termed such machinations as among the worst “double
crosses” he had witnessed. Cramer speculated that Carswell was
being influenced by the “back room wiles” of Kirk and Gurney
because Kirk had a state patrolman intercept Carswell while the
judge was headed for a central Florida vacation after the confirmation debacle.36 The White House and the Republican National Committee sat out the primary even though President
Nixon preferred Cramer. Gerald Warren, deputy press secretary, insisted that Nixon had “no knowledge and no involve37
ment” in Carswell’s candidacy. Gurney, however, claimed that
Nixon aide Harry Dent, a South Carolinian with ties to Senator
Strom Thurmond, had urged Carswell to run.38 Carswell secured endorsements from such celebrities as John Wayne and
Gene Autry and retained Richard Viguerie, the Falls Church,
Virginia, direct mail specialist, to raise funds.39 Cramer’s Senate
33. Miami Herald, September 4, 1970; New York Times, July 13, 1970; U. S. News
and World Report, September 7, 1970, 34-35.
34. Carswell interview; Facts on File 30 (April 20, 1970), 263.
35. Carswell interview; Newsweek, September 21, 1970, 39; Time, September 21 ,
1970, 16-17.
36. Cramer interview; Newsweek, May 4, 1970, 29.
37. New York Times, April 21, 23, 29, September 9, 1970.
38. Ibid., April 23, 1970; Time, September 21, 1970, 16-17.
39. New York Times, May 29, 1970; Miami Herald, September 4, 1970; Tallahassee
Democrat, September 14, 1970. Richard Viguerie declined three requests to
discuss his fund-raising activities in the Carswell campaign.
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candidacy paved the way for his former district assistant, C.
William “Bill” Young of St. Petersburg, then Florida’s senate
minority leader, to seek the Congressional seat Cramer had vacated, a position that Young has retained with few obstacles
since 1971.
Stressing his amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act that
forbade “forced busing” to achieve racial balance, Cramer questioned Carswell’s concurrence in two Fifth Circuit busing
edicts.40 Carswell first tried to ignore Cramer’s accusation, but
he then resorted to “long-winded legalisms” to lambaste the
41
“idiocy” of busing. Carswell’s speeches were compared to “legal
opinions” aimed at such confirmation critics as Senators Edward
Kennedy of Massachusetts and Birch Bayh, Jr., of Indiana. As
a circuit judge, Carswell was bound by high court precedent
that, after 1968, decreed busing as an available tool to achieve
racial balance. Like Cramer, Kirk was also identified with antibusing forces when he attempted without success in 1970 to halt
a Manatee County desegregation plan.42 Kirk satirized the New
Orleans-based “busing” judges for allegedly “drinking in the
French Quarter and reading dirty books.“43 Cramer broadened
his ire beyond busing to denounce “cop killers, bombers, burners, and racial revolutionaries who would destroy America.“44
Cramer’s colleagues, particularly Congressman Sikes, viewed
him as intelligent and hardworking, but Sarasota Democrat
James Haley was less charitable. Haley scoffed that Cramer was
“little in stature and big in mouth” and suggested that he should
“talk less and work more.“45 Prior to the bruised feelings over
the “gentlemen’s agreement,” Cramer and Gurney had worked
well as colleagues but were not close friends. “In looking back
on it, I realize that Gurney was very much his own man and
apparently was not too comfortable with my being the ranking
Republican in the delegation,” Cramer reflected. Kirk tried to
40. Newsweek, September 21, 1970, 39; Time, September 21, 1970, 16-17; Tallahassee Democrat, September 6, 1970; Miami Herald, September 4, 1970.
41. New York Times, July 31, 1970; Miami Herald, September 4, 1970; Tallahassee
Democrat, September 6, 1970.
42. New York Times, September 13, 1970; Miami Herald, September 4, October
17, 1970; Time, September 21, 1970, 16-17.
43. Miami Herald, September 5, 1970.
44. New York Times, August 31, 1970; Facts on File 30 (September 16, 1970), 661.
45. Tampa Tribune, June 18, 1967.
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isolate Cramer from Gurney by naming Gurney’s Orlando law
firm counsel for the Florida Turnpike Authority at a $100,000
annual retainer. By contrast, Cramer’s firm received no state
business. 46
Cramer said that he had a friendly acquaintance with
Carswell prior to 1970, but he subsequently viewed Carswell as
a “pawn” of “would-be kingmakers” Kirk and Gurney. Cramer
attributed his primary triumph to his grassroots base and to
Carswell’s lack of campaign experience.47 Carswell, however,
claims his own support among Democrats would have asserted
itself had Florida used the “open primary” of Georgia or
Alabama. Carswell further maintains that the successful Democratic senatorial nominee Lawton Chiles told him privately that
Chile’s polls showed Cramer would lose the general election
but that Carswell would be competitive. Carswell said his polls
showed that he could obtain nearly all the Republican vote and
40 percent Democratic backing.48
The Cramer-Kirk schism also affected Jack Eckerd’s gubernatorial aspirations. A native Pennsylvanian who had relocated
to Florida after World War II to launch a drugstore chain
specializing in innovative merchandising, Eckerd declared for
governor before Carswell entered the Senate race. He warned
that Kirk’s renomination could produce a Republican fiasco in
the fall.49 In a primary endorsement, the Miami Herald depicted
Eckerd as an “efficient campaigner with the ability to bring
people together constructively” with “a common touch, dedication to high principle and organizing genius.“50 Though loosely
aligned with Eckerd, Cramer endorsed no one in the gubernatorial primary that also included State Representative (and later
Congressman) Louis “Skip” Bafalis. Cramer admits that he
voted for Eckerd in the primary and runoff but denies having
encouraged Eckerd to run. “I obviously didn’t say I would oppose him but indicated that I had my own race.” Distraught that
Kirk’s antics had led to a fratricidal primary, Cramer said he
46. Cramer interview; New York Times, April 21, 1970; Miami Herald, September
4, 1970.
47. Cramer interview; New York Times, April 22, 1970.
48. Carswell interview; Tallahassee Democrat, September 4, 1970. Lawton Chiles
did not reply to two written requests for an interview.
49. Cramer interview.
50. Miami Herald, September 6, 1970.
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“customarily” avoided involvement in primaries outside his own
race.51 Kirk claims that Cramer assisted Eckerd, and he hurls
harsh words at both men. Kirk, whom the press had depicted
as the arrogant “Claudius Maximus I,” said Eckerd is “notorious
for his ability to change the scope of the truth. He has an ego
problem.” Kirk denounced Eckerd for having contributed funds
to several Democrats in earlier elections, for allegedly running
down a Cuban fisherman in a yacht race, and for spending
heavily from his personal fortune. As for Cramer, Kirk claimed
that he had exercised no “input on the nation after eight
[House] terms.“52
Cramer polled 220,553 votes to Carswell’s 121,281. A third
contender, businessman George Balmer, drew 10,947 votes.53
Carswell expressed no regret over having resigned from the
bench to seek the elusive Senate seat.54 Republican Senator
Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, who opposed Carswell’s confirmation, said Carswell was “asking for it, and he got what he deserved.“55 Kirk received 172,888 primary ballots, but Bafalis’s
48,378 votes were enough to require a runoff with Eckerd, who
received 137,731. In the runoff, Kirk prevailed, 199,943 to
152,327, after obtaining Bafalis’s reluctant endorsement.56 In
Melbourne, Kirk denied that he had arranged any deal with
Bafalis, who earlier had accused Kirk of having “made Florida
the laughingstock of the nation.” Years later Bafalis blamed
Kirk’s defeat on “stupid things he did.“57 Though Carswell and
Eckerd endorsed Cramer and Kirk, they were inactive in the fall
campaign. The tense primaries left the GOP in a defensive posture against the Democrats, State Senators Reubin Askew of Pensacola and Lawton Chiles of Lakeland, who skillfully healed
philosophical divisions amid their own ranks. Apprehensive Republicans cheered Congressman Louis Frey, Jr., who in an ad51. Cramer interview; New York Times, September 8, 30, 1970.
52. Kirk interview, March 7, 1988; Miami Herald, September 7, 16, 20, 21, 25,
1970.
53. Florida, Primary Election Returns, September 8, 1970; Time, September 21,
1970, 16-17.
54. Miami Herald, September 3, 1970; New York Times, September 9, 1970.
55. Tallahassee Democrat, September 10, 1970.
56. Florida, Primary Election Results, September 8, 29, 1970; Tallahassee Democrat,
September 12, 14, 1970.
57. Miami Herald, September 9, 16, October 23, 1970; quoted in Lamis, TwoParty South, 292.
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dress before the GOP state convention in Orlando implored the
factions to forget their “family feud” and unite for the general
election.58
Yet primary lacerations long haunted the GOP. “Askew and
Chiles form a logical team; Kirk and Cramer don’t,” insisted the
Miami Herald in reference to an “uneasy alliance” between the
Republican nominees. 5 9 Despite the public unity after the
primaries, tension between Cramer and Kirk endures. Cramer
said he and his staff had voted a straight Republican ticket, but
when asked years later if he had voted for Cramer, Kirk retorted, “That’s my business.“60 The reply reflected columnist
Joseph Kraft’s perception that Kirk had a “theatrical hair for
personalizing issues.“61 In its endorsement of the Democrats,
the Herald lauded Askew for having “captured the imagination
of a state which plainly deserves new leadership.“62 Kirk
ridiculed Askew as a “momma’s boy who wouldn’t have the courage to stand up under the fire of the legislators” and as a “nice,
sweet-looking fellow chosen by ‘liberals’. . . to front for them.“63
Such rhetoric helped reactivate the Democratic coalition.
Michael Thompson, the Bafalis manager who had switched to
Eckerd but then sat out the general election, claimed Kirk had
demolished the “coalition of Republicans and conservative
Democrats who elected him in 1966. . . . The trail from Tallahassee to Palm Beach is littered with the bodies of former friends,
supporters and citizens— all of whom made the fatal mistake of
believing the words of Claude Kirk.” Thompson added that he
would not have been surprised if Kirk had even joined the Liberal-Republican mayor of New York, John Lindsay, on a thirdor fourth-party presidential ticket in 1972.64 Eckerd found that
his initial satisfaction with Kirk’s election “soon dissipated into
disappointment and embarrassment. . . . I was offended by his
public behavior and chagrined that he was a Republican.” Despite Kirk’s tactics, Eckerd reflected that “time heals all wounds,

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Miami Herald, October 4, 1970; St. Petersburg Times, October 4, 1970.
Miami Herald, October 1, 11, 1970.
Cramer interview; Kirk interview, March 7, 1988.
Miami Herald, September 7, 1970.
Ibid., October 18, 1970.
Ibid., October 30, 1970; Tallahassee Democrat, October 30, 1970.
Miami Herald, September 16, 19, 1970.
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and now I chuckle about it.” Eckerd added that his defeat in
1970 probably prolonged his life.65
In the general election campaign, Cramer questioned
Chiles’s state senate votes to hike automobile liability rates by 50
percent over two years and to augment school bus insurance
premiums while Chiles’s agency held the policy on the Polk
County board, but such “conflict-of-interest” accusations
seemed to have little effect.66 The “self-made” Cramer painted
Chiles as the beneficiary of a “silver-spoon” background, but
when Chiles placed his maximum assets at $300,000, the media
ignored questions about personal wealth.67 Instead, reporters
emphasized “Walking Lawton’s” ninety-two-day, 1,003-mile trek
from the Florida panhandle to Key Largo. Before the walk, a
“public-relations stroke of genius,” Chiles was identified by only
5 percent of voters; afterwards, he gained widespread recognition.68 The Tallahassee Democrat forecast that Chiles’s “weary feet
and comfortable hiking boots” would carry him to victory and
described the forty-year-old Democrat as “a slow-talking country
lawyer” with “boyish amiability” and “back country common
sense and methodical urbane political savvy.“69 Chiles’s “Huck
Finn” image and “common man” rhetoric were contrasted one
night in Miami when he held a fried chicken picnic while the
GOP showcased a black-tie, $1,000-a-plate dinner.70
Cramer could not match Chiles’s public appeal. One observer likened Cramer’s “charisma” to a “speech in the Congressional Record.” A Cramer aide, citing his boss’s congressional
service, decried the difficulty of “selling experience. It’s not a
sexy thing.“71 One Chiles advertisement cleverly urged a “vote
for yourself. Chiles thinks like you do. He walked our streets
and highways to hear what you have to say. That’s why a vote
65. Jack M. Eckerd and Charles P. Conn, Eckerd (Old Tappan, NJ, 1987),
113-19; Miami Herald, September 4, 30, 1970.
66. Miami Herald, October 10, 1970; Tallahassee Democrat, October 10, 18, 1970.
67. Miami Herald, October 23, 1970; Tallahassee Democrat, November 1, 1970.
68. Lamis, Two-Party South, 185; Miami Herald, September 9, 1970; Tallahassee
Democrat, September 6, November 1, 1970; Charles Moritz, ed., Current
Biography Yearbook, 1971 (New York, 1972), 88-90.
69. Tallahassee Democrat, November 1, 1970; New York Times, September 29,
1970.
70. Moritz, Current Biography Yearbook, 1971, 88-90; Bass and DeVries, Transformation of Southern Politics, 124; Miami Herald, September 27, 1970.
71. Tallahassee Democrat, November 1, 1970; Miami Herald, September 4, 1970.
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for Chiles is like a vote for yourself.“72 Publicizing “shoe leather
and a shoestring budget,” Chiles dubbed himself a “problem
solver who doesn’t automatically vote ‘no’ on every issue.“73 Cramer later said he should have demanded more debates and rebuffed the walking tactic. “I never could get that
turned around. He was walking, and I was running. But the
press was enamored with the walk, and he finally changed his
strategy from walking because he . . . didn’t have the contributions to pay for a campaign otherwise. . . . So everytime he was
asked a question about where he stood, he would quote somebody that he met on the campaign trail, to state what he was
going to do when he got to the Senate consistent with what that
constituent had said. The basic approach gave him more credibility to his walk, which had nothing to do with his qualifications
for the Senate but gave him free publicity and appealed to the
‘little man.’ “74
Many Floridians in the 1970s feared that excessive growth
might destroy the state’s natural beauty. When ecology became
a national matter, President Nixon created the Environmental
Protection Agency. Chiles opposed the Cross Florida Barge
Canal, though every member of the state delegation had previously backed the project. Chiles also proposed federal funds to
remove waste from the once bass-teeming Lake Apopka in central Florida.75 By contrast, Cramer received little credit from
environmentalists even though he had drafted the 1956 Water
Pollution Control Act and had sponsored legislation to protect
alligators, stop beach erosion, dredge harbors, and remove oil
spills. Instead, a Cramer critic accused him of weakening antipollution laws. Cramer questioned Chiles’s opposition to a proposed severance tax on phosphate mining. That particularly affected Tampa Bay. “Liberal Lawton has protected the phosphate industry— the state’s single largest polluter,” Cramer
claimed.76 By 1974, a survey showed Floridians favored limits
72.
73.
74.
75.

Miami Herald, September 28, 1970.
Ibid., September 9, October 29, 1970.
Cramer interview.
Moritz, Current Biography Yearbook, 1971, 88-90; Tallahassee Democrat, September 10, October 27, 1970; Miami Herald, October 27, 1970; Public Papers
of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon (Washington, DC, 1971),
957.
76. Tallahassee Democrat, November 1, 1970; Miami Herald, October 23, 24,
1970; “Bill Cramer . . . Who Else?” campaign brochure of Cramer senatorial campaign, 1970.
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on development; 60 percent urged more public funding for
conservation.77
In the 1970 primary, all major papers, except the proCarswell Tallahassee Democrat, had urged Cramer’s nomination,
but only three papers— in Orlando, Fort Myers, and Pasco
County— stuck with Cramer during the fall. Chiles hence benefited from a nearly unanimous press.78 In the face of such media
opposition, Cramer tried in vain to pin the “liberal” label on
Chiles, who instead preferred the epithet “progressive conservative.“79 Explaining Cramer’s failure to make “liberalism” an issue
in 1970, the New York Times observed that Askew and Chiles
“convey amiable good ol’boy qualities with moderate-to-liberal
aspirations that do not strike fear into the hearts of conservatives.“80
Chiles, who relied heavily on Senator Spessard Holland’s
backing, joked that Cramer had expected to face the primary
runner-up, former Governor C. Farris Bryant who, like LeRoy
Collins, Gurney’s foe two years earlier, had ties to the Johnson
administration. “I’m not anything Cramer thought he would be
running against. So he’s reduced to telling lies about me,” Chiles
quipped. 81 Chiles boasted that Cramer could bring “Nixon,
Agnew, Reagan and anybody else he wants. . . . I’ll take Holland
on my side against all of them.“82 Chiles challenged Cramer’s
support for Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan, which had been
rejected by the Senate Finance Committee. Opponents claimed
the plan would have increased costs, but Cramer argued for
keeping welfare families together with hope of ultimate independence. In 1988, at the end of his Senate career, Chiles, who
had earlier opposed such reform as “a guaranteed annual income,” backed a welfare program similar to what the Senate
77. Bass and DeVries, Transformation of Southern Politics, 116.
78. Tallahassee Democrat, September 6, 1970; Cramer interview. Among papers
endorsing Chiles were the St. Petersburg Times, Tampa Tribune, Tallahassee
Democrat, Miami Herald, Pensacola News-Journal, Clearwater Sun, Sarasota
Herald Tribune, Tampa Times, Sanford Herald, St. Augustine Record, and Ocala
Star-Banner.
79. Quoted in Numan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham, Southern Politics and
the Second Reconstruction (Baltimore, 1975), 146-47; Miami Herald, October
27, 1970.
80. New York Times, October 11, 1970.
81. Miami Herald, October 1, 6, 14, 28, 1970; Tallahassee Democrat, October 22,
1970; New York Times, September 29, 1970.
82. Tallahassee Democrat, September 30, 1970.
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had rejected in 1970. That plan cleared the Senate with only
one dissenting vote.83 Chiles adopted his rival’s stance on civil
disorders by supporting the law that mandates the death penalty
for “bombers” who cause deaths.84 Cramer, had introduced the
antiriot measure, approved 389-25 by the House, that made
police assault a federal crime. The law, designed to halt criminals who cross state lines, was lauded at Cramer rallies by Vice
President Agnew and Attorney General John Mitchell. It was
the basis for the 1970 arrest of black communist Angela Davis
and five of the 1968 “Chicago Seven” defendants.85
Chiles countered Cramer’s claim that a GOP-controlled Senate would mean removal of the controversial Arkansas Senator
J. William Fulbright as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee by stressing that other southern Democrats would also
forfeit chairmanships to Republicans. 86 Chiles claimed that
Cramer would act as a Nixon “rubber stamp” whose partisan
interests would prohibit independence.87 In his presidential papers, Nixon, who campaigned for Cramer in Miami Beach, Palm
Beach, St. Petersburg, and Tallahassee, cited the congressman’s
sponsorship of “significant legislation designed to stop bombing
and riots” and his record on the environment, senior citizens,
and education.88 Nixon said more Republicans were needed in
Congress to bring an “honorable end” to the Vietnam War,
maintain America’s international presence, and halt “permissiveness, pornography, and busing.” The heavily Democratic
congressional majorities soon prompted Nixon to claim an
“ideological” majority, a bipartisan coalition of “conservatives”
and “moderates” to pass his programs.89 Critical of dissenting
youth, Nixon reminded the “silent majority” in St. Petersburg
that the “impossible dream in most countries is possible in

83. Ibid., October 10, 1970; New York Times, September 30, 1988.
84. Miami Herald, October 14, 1970.
85. Ibid., October 8, 14, 1970; Tallahassee Democrat, October 14, 15, November
1, 1970.
86. Miami Herald, September 4, 1970; Tallahassee Democrat, September 9, October 25, 1970.
87. Miami Herald, October 23, 1970; New York Times, October 27, 1970.
88. Nixon Papers, 950; Facts on File 30 (October 28, 1970), 788.
89. Nixon Papers, 951-56; Miami Herald, October 28, 1970; New York Times,
October 28, 29, 1970.
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90

America.“ Making the first presidential appearance in Tallahassee since William McKinley, Nixon plugged “neighborhood
schools” and renounced busing for the “sole purpose of achieving racial balance” as contrary to law and “quality education.“91
Though Chiles also opposed busing, he attracted black support
by belittling Cramer’s antibusing amendment as “just talk” and
“an emotional issue.” Cramer, in turn, challenged Chiles’s vote
in the Florida senate to give court-imposed busing orders the
“status of state law,” while Chiles proposed “magnet schools” to
negate busing conflicts.92
Despite the Nixon-Agnew “road show,” polls indicated weak
Republican support. “The Republicans Are in Trouble in
Florida,” predicted a New York Times headline. On October 25,
the Miami Herald poll placed Kirk and Cramer with 38 and 39
percent, respectively, compared to 62 and 60 percent for Askew
and Chiles. The poll defined the chief issues as law and order,
rebellious youth, the Vietnam War, and drugs, and found that
blue-collar voters were identifying the Republicans with “inflation,” then at one of the lowest levels of the forthcoming decade.
Democrats further benefited from the perception of Askew and
Chiles as “overnight sensations.” Cramer insisted that the polls
reflected only the views of the media whom, he claimed, “love
those liberals.“93 The GOP was further weakened when partisans
of George Wallace, the 1968 American Independent party presidential candidate, citing Kirk’s earlier condemnations of Wallace, endorsed Askew and Chiles. Kirk had previously renounced Wallace as a “racist” and a “flaming liberal” in conspiracy with President Johnson to thwart the emergence of southern Republicanism.94 The St. Petersburg Times found Kirk trailing
Askew by twenty-two points in Cramer’s home county of Pinellas, while Cramer led by just seven points there. The survey
indicated that Kirk would receive support from 51 percent of
90. Nixon Papers, 962; New York Times, October 30, 1970.
91. Miami Herald, October 24, 1970; New York Times, October 29, 1970; Tallahassee Democrat, October 28, 29, 1970.
92. Miami Herald, Septeember 2, October 18, 1970; Tallahassee Democrat, October 18, 1970.
93. New York Times, October 27, November 4, 1970; Miami Herald, October 25,
27, 1970.
94. Quoted in Nick Thimmesch, The Condition of Republicanism (New York,
1968), 239; New York Times, November 5, 1970; Tallahassee Democrat, September 2, October 2, 1970.
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Republicans, while Cramer would garner 75 percent GOP backing. 95
Cramer, Gurney, and Kirk differ on reasons for the GOP
losses in 1970. Besides allowing Chiles’s “walk” to go unchallenged and failing to seek more debates, Cramer cites his reliance on an out-of-state public relations firm not well versed in
Florida politics as factors in the defeat. Moreover, he feels that
the $350,000 spending limit in effect in Florida for the 1970
campaign only did not permit enough television exposure for
minority-party candidates facing institutional obstacles. Cramer
also maintains that the intraparty schism hurt his candidacy even
though the GOP fared poorly all across the South in 1970.96
Gurney blames the defeat on the failure to attract enough
Democratic support. Kirk, denying the impact of the schism,
insists that no Republican could have been elected in Florida
that year because Askew and Chiles have re-cemented the
majority coalition. Indeed, the Democrats, finding that “fresh
faces and new looks outweighed age and experience,” gained
across-the-board support from working-class whites, blacks,
Jews, Cuban-Americans, metropolitan residents, and rural voters. 97
Cramer polled 772,817 votes, or 61,716 more than the
number of registered Republicans. Chiles’s 902,438 ballots, representing majorities in fifty-five counties, was 1,121,830 below
the number of registered Democrats. 98 Hence, much of an
apathetic electorate sat out one of Florida’s most contested
senatorial races. Robert Sikes contends that numerous Farris
Bryant supporters may have defected to Cramer, but if that
occurred, many Republicans either did not vote or bolted to
Chiles. Sikes said the Kirk-Askew match had little impact on the
Senate race because Kirk was a “political accident” with little
99
control over other contests . Askew won all but nine counties
to defeat Kirk, 984,305 to 746,243. Cramer polled 26,574 votes
more than Kirk and took the five counties that Kirk lost: Broward, Collier, Martin, Pasco, and Pinellas. Cramer ran 11,077
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Miami Herald, October 4, 1970.
Cramer interview.
Charlton W. Tebeau, A History of Florida (Coral Gables, 1971), 452.
Florida, General Election Returns, November 3, 1970.
Robert Sikes to author, Crestview, FL, June 1, 1987.
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votes ahead of Chues in Pinellas County where registered Republicans then outnumbered Democrats by 3,059. Kirk and
Cramer each won seven counties: Indian River, Lake, Manatee,
Orange, Osceola, Sarasota, and Seminole, and Kirk took the two
counties— Clay and St. Johns— -that were lost by Cramer.100
A disappointed Cramer weathered defeat in stride, having
earlier told a reporter that “time and circumstance often measure a man’s future. Quite often if you aspire to something, it
becomes more unattainable because you are seeking it.“101
Generous in defeat, Kirk vowed to make Askew’s term “as glorious as mine has been.“102 Askew said the Democrats represented
a “new attitude in politics and a new confidence in the people”
and hailed his party’s “willingness to take on . . . the ‘sacred
cows’frontally . . . and to set really a new tone.“103
Two months after the general election, tensions between
Cramer and Gurney resumed when pro-Cramer L. E. “Tommy”
Thomas, a Panama City automobile dealer associated with the
later Reagan campaigns, ousted the Gurney-endorsed Duke
Crittenden of Orlando for the state chairmanship. Thereafter,
three congressmen friendly with Cramer— J. Herbert Burke of
Hollywood, Louis Frey of Orlando, and C. W. Young of St.
Petersburg— and national committeewoman Paula Hawkins of
Maitland prepared a letter to the White House urging that
Cramer, not Gurney, be Florida’s patronage advisor. Gurney
quickly initiated “peace” meetings with his intraparty rivals, and
the letter was never mailed.104 Gurney, who retired as senator
in 1974 and failed in a later quest to regain his former House
seat, was thereafter charged, and acquitted, of federal and state
allegations involving $300,000 in unreported campaign funds
and kickbacks from federal housing contracts.105
Despite talk to the contrary, Cramer never again sought public office and declined to consider appointment as a federal
judge. Instead, he opened a Washington law practice. In 1973,
100.
101.
102.
103.

Florida, General Election Returns, November 3, 1970.
Tampa Tribune, June 18, 1967.
Tallahassee Democrat, November 4, 1970.
Quoted in Lamis, Two-Party South, 186; Bass and DeVries, Transformation
of Southern Politics, 126.
104. Tampa Tribune, June 13, 1971; Miami Herald, September 26, 1971.
105. Lamis, Two-Party South, 293; Bass and DeVries, Transformation of Southern
Politics, 125.
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Cramer directed the confirmation team for the elevation of
House Republican Leader Gerald Ford to the vice-presidency.
He lobbied on behalf of several foreign governments, including
that of Nicaraguan President Somoza. In 1979, he headed the
first American trade mission to China after the normalization
of relations. Cramer also represented the Republican National
Committee when the Ripon Society unsuccessfully fought the
delegate formula plan adopted in 1972 when Cramer had
chaired the RNC rules committee.106 In the fall of 1988, Cramer,
while maintaining his Washington legal office, returned to St.
Petersburg where he now practices law and is active in Tampa
land development with his former aid, Jack Inscoe.
After his 1970 gubernatorial primary loss, Eckerd defeated
Mrs. Hawkins for the 1974 Senate nomination but was beaten
by Democrat Richard Stone when the American Independent
nominee, Dr. John Grady, split the anti-Democratic vote. In a
surprising move in 1978, Kirk switched allegiance to the Democrats to run again for governor after a federal court barred on
technical grounds his planned independent candidacy. Even as
a Democrat for the second time around, Kirk said he still twice
supported Reagan and initially backed Congressman Connie
Mack III, who scored a wafer-thin triumph for the United States
Senate seat Chiles had unexpectedly vacated in 1988.107 However, Kirk himself ran as a Democratic candidate for Chiles’s
seat but gained few primary votes. In 1990, Kirk again switched
parties and announced his candidacy for governor as a Republican.
As governor, Reubin Askew formed a staff devoted to candidate recruitment and issues, an endeavor that helped to keep
the Florida GOP in the doldrums for a full decade. Democrats
became a real political party, instead of the previous “collection

106. Cramer interview; New York Times, December 24, 1970; Michael J.
Krvzanek. U. S.-Latin American Relations (New York, 1985), 122-23: Jack
Inscoe, telephone conversation with author, March 5, 1990.
107. Kirk interview, March 7, 1988. Though Kirk left the GOP, his son-in-law,
State Senator Ander Crenshaw of Jacksonville, is an active Republican.
Chiles’s easy re-elections in 1976 and 1982, when he overwhelmed Dr.
John Grady and State Senator Van B. Poole, respectively, made him a
favorite for a fourth term in 1988 until he decided to step down. Askew
briefly entered the race for the seat Chiles vacated but withdrew, citing
fundraising barriers.
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of individual contenders who often stood to lose, rather than
gain, by endorsing each other.“108 Excluding Nixon’s 1972 landslide and Paula Hawkins’s victory for public service commissioner, the Florida GOP won no statewide races throughout the
1970s. Recovery from the Cramer-Kirk schism was indeed slow.
Not until 1980 did the GOP rebound, when voters chose both
Reagan electors and Mrs. Hawkins to fill Gurney’s former Senate seat. She was beaten after one term in 1986 by Governor
Robert “Bob” Graham, Askew’s successor. Offsetting Hawkins’s
loss, the GOP finally regained the governorship with the election
of Robert “Bob” Martinez, the state’s first governor of Hispanic
descent. And by 1989, as a result of regular and special elections
and a Democratic defection, Florida sported a rare Republican
majority in its United States House of Representatives delegation.
Florida Republicans continue to make impressive gains in
voter registration. In October 1988, Republicans numbered
2,360,434, compared to 3,264,105 Democrats, 421,398 independents, and a scattering claiming other affiliations. Twelve
counties are majority Republican by registration: Brevard,
Charlotte, Collier, Indian River, Lake, Lee, Manatee, Martin,
Orange, Pinellas, Sarasota, and Seminole. Between 1986 and
1988, Republican ranks swelled by 321,603 voters, while Democratic registration increased by just 49,352. For the first time,
Republican registration trails the Democrats by fewer than
1,000,000 voters. Between October 1988, and April 1989, about
44,000 new voters registered as Republicans, in contrast to only
18,000 as Democrats. In the spring of 1989 the GOP was out-registering the Democrats nearly 6,500 to 1,000.109 Republican potential in Florida had been particularly encouraging at the be108. Tebeau, History of Florida, 452. For a look at Askew’s racial policies, see
David Campbell and Joe R. Feagin, “Black Politics in the South: A Descriptive Analysis,” Journal of Politics 37 (February 1975), 129-62.
109. Florida, County Voter Registration, October 1988; Human Events 49 (May 20,
1989), 2, quoting from Hastings Wyman’s The Southern Political Report. Of
the twelve counties with a majority of registered Republicans, only
Cramer’s home county of Pinellas voted against 1988 GOP senatorial
nominee Connie Mack of Cape Coral. Pinellas gave Mack 47 percent, but
the Democratic counties of Escambia (Pensacola), Bay (Panama City), and
Duval (Jacksonville), all of which had stood firmly with Chiles and Askew
in 1970, supported Mack who won by fewer than 34,000 votes (out of
more than 4,065,000 cast) over Democratic Congressman Kenneth
“Buddy” MacKay of Ocala.
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ginning of the 1970s until the divisive schism between partisans
of Claude Kirk and William Cramer sidetracked the possibility
that one day the GOP might become the state’s majority party.
Republicans at the time were numerically weak, held few congressional seats, and lacked the breadth and depth essential to
sustain a future majority party. The legacy of the 1970 campaign rests with the squandering of opportunity, often one of
the most precious commodities in politics. A minority party mistakenly presumed it could function— quite prematurely and
falsely as it turned out— like a majority party. After the 1970
schism, the GOP began once again to accept defeat as natural
and inevitable, particularly when noncontroversial moderates
equipped with favorable media coverage and sheer political skill
kept Democrats in power by secure margins. But with time,
Floridians rediscovered the benefits of the two-party system and
demonstrated a willingness to reconsider Republicans for
statewide leadership. The lessons of the Cramer-Kirk schism
rest with the need to nurture firm political roots and eschew
intraparty squabbles that work to enhance the opposition.
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